The battle of Dien Bien Phu is one of the most studied engagements of the twentieth century. Its outcome signaled a significant step in the decline of European hegemony over colonial holdings, and marked a watershed event in the establishment of a Communist foothold in Southeast Asia. Military histories on the battle tend to be in agreement as to the reasons for French failure and Vietminh victory, with logistics usually appearing toward the top of the list. On the one hand, the Vietminh are lauded for their successful mobilization of massive proportions, while on the other, the French are chided for the failure of their technologically superior aerial resupply effort. But this orthodoxy is in need of refinement. To be sure, the leading cause of French defeat was logistical bankruptcy, but not in matters of strict quantity, but rather in the quality of the aerial delivery. To be sure, the aerial resupply effort succeeded in succoring the French garrison during the critical fifty-six days of the battle; but as the Vietminh ground advance shrunk the drop zones, with antiaircraft fire driving the aerial delivery to higher altitudes, more and more drops fell into the hands of the enemy-an enemy who was starved of ammunition and on the verge of collapse without these misdropped supplies. Conventional wisdom to the contrary, the Battle of Dien Bien Phu was not over before it started.

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